The technology in science-fiction is capable of having the
same kind of metaphorical implications as the magic in fantasy. As I mentioned last week, the two kinds of literary device are the same in many ways. But,
what makes these pairs different from each other (fantasy and magic on the one
hand, science-fiction and technology on the other) bears some further
investigation.
The primary difference I mentioned before was that the
technology in science-fiction is meant to be within man’s grasp,
although it is beyond our current capacity, whereas magic and the other things
that appear in fantastical literature posit a radical difference between the
real world
and the world of the story. So, for instance, in The Lord of The
Rings, Mr. Tolkien implicitly asks us to accept that, in Middle Earth, eagles
talk and make political alliances. This is not intended to be somehow
aspirational. Tolkien doesn’t intend to inspire zoologists to investigate the
secret language and societal habits of predatory birds; this is just how it is
in Middle Earth. While, on the other hand, Isaac Asimov’s Foundation series is
about a supposedly possible future (rather than a legendary past) in which we
discover effective means of interstellar space-travel and spread out into the
wider universe. (“Supposedly” in the literal sense that we are meant to suppose
it).
So, that is the difference, and it is an important one. But,
it is more a matter of difference in degree than kind because there is always something
fantastic in science-fiction. Even if the author thinks it is a good guess, and
probably the way things will work out, unless he is writing a story involving only
current technology (e.g. a story set in modern day about a manned mission to
Mars), he is making something up, and to that extent the story is a
fantasy. And, as I suggested before, this means science-fiction is fantasy with
the implication of possibility, which, if we don’t have our wits about us, can
lead to superstition (or at least be a vehicle for it).
One way we can keep our wits about is by trying to figure
out what exactly is being posited by a work of science-fiction. People
sometimes make the distinction between “hard” science-fiction and, well, not
hard science-fiction (we’ll call it soft, but I don’t know that anyone else
does). It’s a good distinction, because “hard” science-fiction uses the
fantastical elements of the story to bridge the gap between what we know or can
accomplish, and what we might know or be able to accomplish in the future, and
then takes seriously the mechanics and implications of what is imagined. Soft
sci-fi, on the other hand, is much closer to simple fantasy and magic, in that
it posits things and runs with them (ray guns, battle-cruisers, teleporters,
fair and stable economic systems), and leaves the theoretical underpinnings to
fend for themselves.
In the first case, we’re dealing with something like an
argument with a couple holes that we’ve been asked to accept for the sake of
following the argument through. In the second case, something has simply been
taken for granted, and the implications of granting it aren’t necessarily
clear.
I’ll end with an example. The recent critical failure
starring Johnny Depp, “Transcendence”, posits that a human person could be
somehow “downloaded” into a computer. This is not a new idea (Lawnmower Man had
it, X-files had it, even the new Captain America movie had it). One might
understand the appeal of such a thing (immortality by promethean,
Tower-of-Babel-esqe means) or the lurking horror of it (a corrupt perversion of
immortality by promethean, Tower-of-Babel-esqe means). Understanding and
thinking about it in those terms is treating it like any fantastical element of
any kind of fiction. But, this is science-fiction. Johnny Depp’s soul didn’t
migrate into a Golem by means of the incantations of a cabalistic rabbi. They
built a supercomputer, and scanned the electrical activity in his brain. Then,
when the computer started acting like him (at least him texting, or making a
Skype call) they said it was him living in the computer.
Now, supposing this to be a possibility in the sci-fi sense
has radical implications. It fundamentally determines what you can think
a man is. It equates the electrical activity in the brain with the activity of
the mind, which implies that the mind is somehow a physical byproduct of
electrical activity (this is an obvious impossibility, which I invite you to
tease out if you haven’t already. It’s a hoot). Not only that, it also implies
that not even this electrical activity happening here is what
constitutes the person’s mind, but says rather that any reproduction of
the electrical activity is as good as the original, and that this reproduction
is possible. This, in turn, implies that human beings have no identity or soul,
but are simply carbon-based computer algorithms. I find this untenable and
nightmarish. But, regardless of what one might think of it, one should at least
realize what kind of minefield he’s stepping into by positing that Mr. Depp
could live in a computer.
© 2014 John Hiner III
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